Bulletin #125 from the Coordinating Committee of The International HHV-6 Protest and Teach-in at Harvard (November 9-11, 2015)
Peter Duesberg and the Duesbergians:
Half a Hero is Better than None
“As Max Weber put it, ‘An exhaustive causal
investigation of any concrete phenomenon in its full reality is not only
impossible, it is simply nonsense.’ Epidemiologists know this and do not
attempt to include all causal factors in their analyses. They select some
causes and omit others. Since the epidemiologist must, however, employ some
criteria in the selection process, whether consciously or not, the final
roundup of causes is never neutral. It necessarily reflects both the
(human-made) rules of epidemiology and the values and assumptions of the person
selecting the cause. The list probably reproduces many elements of the dominant
political ideology as well, if only because the language we use to describe
reality is so heavily influenced by the interests of powerful groups.”
—Sylvia Noble Tesh, Hidden Arguments: PoliticalIdeology and Disease Prevention Policy (Page 68)
To say that the achievement of Peter
Duesberg is a glass half full, should never be seen as damning with faint
praise. Unflappable, imperfect Peter Duesberg heroically changed the course of
the AIDS epidemic and history itself by his actions and part of his personal
tragedy is that he could have changed it even more if he had looked deeper and
been more critically attentive to the politics of the Centers for Disease
Control’s heterosexist epidemiology.
In the introduction to his 1987 interview
with Duesberg, John Lauritsen wrote, “Peter Duesberg came to the United States
about 20 years ago from Germany. He is professor of Molecular Biology at the
University of California in Berkeley. It is because of his interest in
retroviruses, on which he is an authority, that he became involved in
questioning the ‘AIDS virus etiology.’” (The AIDS War p.47)
In that interview Duesberg argued that HIV
could not be the cause of AIDS because of “the consistent biochemical
inactivity of the virus.” (AW p.47) He told Lauritsen that “Even in
patients who were dying from disease, the virus is almost undetectable, while
RNA synthesis is essentially not detectable, (AW p.47) And Duesberg
said, “So that is one of the key arguments, and there is no exception to the
rule that pathogens in order to be pathogenic have to be active.” (AW
p.48) He also insisted that “very few potentially susceptible cells are ever
infected, and those that are infected don’t do anything. The virus just sits
here.” (AW p.48)
Duesberg also argued that the long latency
period of the disease was “a very suspicious signal that the virus is unlikely
to be solely the direct cause as they claim.” (AW p.48) He insisted that
retroviruses “are the most benign viruses that we know” and “they can remain in
the cell in latent form.” (AW p.49) And most damning of all to the HIV
hypothesis, according to Duesberg, was the fact that “When AIDS is diagnosed,
they say that now it’s possible for the disease—but the virus is not doing any
more than it had done before when there were no symptoms of the disease.” (AW
p.49) Duesberg concluded that the presence of antibodies to HIV was proof that
the virus had been neutralized and asserted that it was “a gross injustice to
discriminate against anyone on the basis of having antibodies.” (AW
p.50)
One
of the most noble aspects of Duesberg’s AIDS criticism and whistleblowing on
the HIV mistake (or fraud) issue was his extraordinary—almost
visionary—sensitivity to the damage it was going to do to the health and
liberties of those who were victimized by it. In general, the people he argued
with, those who benefited financially and professionally from the HIV
hypothesis, had a rather cold and cavalier attitude toward the effect their
brilliant ideas often had on the minorities who were affected. (They certainly
never seemed to ask themselves what the consequences would be if they
were wrong.)
Duesberg deserves credit for being one of
the first people to realize (without saying as much) that the HIV/AIDS theory
was an instance of what should be called “abnormal science.” One of the wittiest men
engaged in the AIDS issue, he could often find the humorous absurdities
implicit in the HIV theory. When HIV was called a “slow virus,” he said, “There
are no slow viruses, only slow scientists.” In public forums he always
presented his opinions in a collegial manner, but he was also always capable of
leaving his opponents hemorrhaging from a cutting sarcasm presented with deadly
charm. It may have been the fact that he verbally earned the role of the alpha
intellect in any professional gathering that inspired both envy and vengeance
from his HIV establishment opponents. They were often simply intellectually
outclassed, even if they held all the money and the political cards. Nothing
rattles totalitarian or abnormal science more than a clever and steadfast nontotalitarian
scientist.
If Duesberg suffered from any deficits in
the area of judgment, it may have been an inability to imagine a different AIDS
epidemic caused by a dynamic, multisystemic virus like HHV-6 (and its family)
which could manifest itself in a variety of surprising ways (like AIDS, chronic
fatigue syndrome, autism etc.) depending on a variety of factors. Duesberg told
Lauritsen “AIDS is a condition which includes so many parameters that it’s
almost inconceivable to define a simple pathogen as the cause, considering the
diverse patterns of the disease.” (AW p.52) Duesberg didn’t think
outside the box of the CDC’s epidemiology. He never considered the possibility
that the CDC had missed a whole world of undetected epidemiological data (like
the data from the chronic fatigue syndrome epidemic) that would have completely
changed the picture of the disease’s patterns. And, unfortunately, the idea that there might be
something in the world that could be called a multisystemic virus like HHV-6
which could cause many different patterns of disease, was simply not on
his radar.
At the time that Lauritsen first
interviewed Duesberg—in 1987—Duesberg remained a bit of an agnostic on what was
actually causing AIDS, saying, “We haven’t excluded anything” and “I really
wonder what it could be.” (AW p.53) Compared to where he would end up,
he was a demure etiological virgin at that point. He was only beginning to
consider the role of recreational drugs as a possible cause saying, “I’m really
just guessing here, but I think this is where more research should be done.” (AW
p.53)
Unfortunately, as time went on Duesberg
seems to have been encouraged or even pressured by some of his colleagues to
take a stronger public stand on what he thought actually was the cause
of AIDS and he became far less tentative and open-minded, passionately adding
to his anti-HIV gospel a seemingly unshakable conviction that recreational
drugs explained AIDS in gay men. Regardless of its merits, such a position immediately
lost him the ready-made constituency of the gay community who seemed to have
been invited by Duesberg and his followers to be exonerated for a transmissible
infection only to be convicted as a group in an alternative heterosexist
fashion for having a unique gay (and—let’s not forget— criminal) drug-taking
lifestyle. With some notable exceptions, Duesberg walked into a big gay "thanks
but no thanks"; he had jumped the gay shark. It was a tragic development for
both parties, because politically Duesberg really needed an activist gay
community to help him challenge the mistaken HIV hypothesis, which he felt was
unfairly threatening the liberties and health of the gay community. He was the
enemy of the gay community’s determined CDC/NIH enemy but he wasn’t perceived
as its friend. By rejecting Duesberg’s half a glass of truth about the virus,
the gay community ended up in the open arms of the AIDS establishment and
crusading public health authorities complete with all the goodies they had in
store for their willing, eager and all too compliant patient population.
Peter Duesberg detailed his argument about
the nature of the AIDS epidemic and his struggle with the AIDS establishment in
his book, Inventing the AIDS Virus, which was published by Regnery Publishing
in 1996. In the publisher’s Preface, Alfred Regnery notes that “AIDS is the
first political disease.” In his acknowledgments, Duesberg wrote, “I extend my
gratitude to my most critical opponents in the AIDS debate, who have
unwittingly provided me the great volume of evidence by which I have disproved
the virus-AIDS hypothesis and exposed the political maneuverings behind the war
on AIDS.” (IAV p.x)
Duesberg’s book could be used as a primary
text if college courses are ever given on the politics, sociology and
psychology of abnormal science. He fleshes out many parts of his argument
against the HIV theory of AIDS causation already mentioned in his 1987
interview with Lauritsen. While Duesberg is often thought to be someone who
encouraged the rethinking of the AIDS issue, the book supports the notion
already mentioned that in reality he actually never went far enough,
never really did a true radical rethinking of AIDS because he works with a
tacit acceptance of the basic epidemiological premises and “facts” provided by
the CDC and the HIV/AIDS establishment. By leaving their paradigm’s “factual”
assumptions standing, he ultimately jeopardized his own analysis. Duesberg’s
critical tact was to take the “facts” as they were provided by the CDC and to
try and poke holes in their etiological logic by showing how they failed to
successfully make predictions about the course of the epidemic or by arguing
that the facts as given by the CDC contradicted other formally known (hence,
published) facts. The problem was that AIDS involved ground zero
epidemiological definitions of what an AIDS case actually was, and if that
definition had, at the very beginning of the epidemic, been distorted by
evidence that had been cherry-picked, or had been ignored because of political
blinders, then there was a good chance that Duesberg—even with his superb
skills of logic and reason—was trapped in an epidemiological funhouse of
“garbage in garbage out.” Saying the CDC mistakenly linked the wrong virus to
cases of AIDS begs a question: And what if the CDC completely got the
definition of AIDS cases wrong to begin with? What if they were correlating
apples with oranges? Or, more troubling, that what the CDC thought were
epidemiological apples and oranges were really all apples or all oranges?
Duesberg never illuminated all of the fundamental possibilities of what
could have gone wrong epidemiologically. Duesberg was in a Donald Rumsfeld
situation where he didn’t know what he didn’t know.
Duesberg worked with the epidemiological
predictions the AIDS authorities were giving him and tried to show that when
the predictions based on them did not work out, they reflected poorly on the
credibility of the HIV theory. He argued, “Officials have continually predicted
the explosion of AIDS into the general population through sexual transmission
of HIV, striking males and females equally, as well as homosexuals and
heterosexuals, to be followed by a corresponding increase in the rate of death.
. . . In short, the alleged viral disease does not seem to be spreading from
the 1 million HIV-positive Americans to the remaining 250 million.” (IAV
p.5)
Duesberg’s logic brilliantly skewered the
CDC’s notion that AIDS was an equal opportunity disease. But again one has to
note that the one caveat he didn’t acknowledge was that if the CDC’s definition
of what an AIDS case was turned out to be dead wrong, then all bets were
off about correlated and potentially causative factors. Just debunking the
logic behind the weak correlation of putative AIDS cases with HIV was not the
same as debunking the notion of some fundamentally different kind of AIDS
epidemic still occurring, not only in the gay community, but also in some
form in the general population. If, at the very basic level of defining what a
case is and what a case isn’t, profound mistakes had been made, then one
couldn’t really know where the disease was and where it wasn’t. And then the
issue of HIV not being the cause of what was being called AIDS would in that
case be totally beside the point. If anything, the HIV mistake should
have made people wonder if those in charge at the CDC had gotten something even
more profoundly wrong in the initial working definition of AIDS which
subsequently was carved in stone thanks to the abnormal, totalitarian scientific culture
that protected it.
Insofar as Duesberg recognized that it all
just didn’t add up, he graciously
performed a great humanitarian service over and over again by telling
the world that as long as the HIV establishment was in charge of AIDS we were
essentially trapped in a realm of unreliable and untrustworthy pseudoscience
where people were going to get hurt. And luckily, for three decades, at great
personal expense, Duesberg valiantly refused to shut up. Perplexed, Duesberg
wrote, “Something is wrong with this picture. How could the largest and most
sophisticated scientific establishment in history have failed so miserably in
saving lives and even in forecasting the epidemic’s toll?” (IAV
p.5) Ironically, given that Duesberg
himself was blind to what turned out to be the CFS epidemic and HHV-6 spectrum
catastrophe, the premise of his rhetorical question turned out to be a tragic
understatement.
Duesberg’s suggestion about what should be
done reinforces the notion that his call to a reassessment of AIDS and HIV just
wasn’t intellectually radical or fundamental enough. Duesberg’s prescription
for the problem was that “Faced with this medical debacle, scientists should
re-open a simple but most essential question: What causes AIDS?” (IAV
p.6) Again, it was not really a radical return to nosological and epidemiological ground zero.
A return to ground zero would have involved asking if the epidemiological
common immunological denominator that determined what a case actually was
itself needed to be audited by looking closely and in an immunologically
sophisticated manner at the entire population. Duesberg was like an
accountant who looks at the books for discrepancies, but never goes into the
warehouse to see if what’s there matches the inventory numbers. His due
diligence only went so far. Quasi-due-diligence is ultimately not helpful. The definition of AIDS was on the books and
unfortunately, taken at face value by Duesberg. It didn’t necessarily match
what was actually going on in doctor’s offices all over America and it didn’t
necessarily reflect the actual disaster that was occurring in the immune
systems of the entire American population. There was a whole immunologically
challenged world beyond the CDC’s published data and the peer-reviewed papers
Duesberg used to play “gotcha” with the CDC’s facts, logic and conclusions.
There was an interesting groupthink bias
in Duesberg and many of his followers, most of whom were heterosexual—some
emphatically so. Not surprisingly, their notion about what was wrong with AIDS
etiology was always biased in the direction of heterosexuals being less (or
not at all) at risk for AIDS as a result of the CDC’s scientific errors.
Sometimes one got the uncanny notion that Duesberg and his followers were
whistling heterosexually in the dark, engaged in trying to convince themselves
that they as a group were safe from the “gay lifestyle” epidemic.
Ironically, considering their apparent need for personal immunological safety,
though, is the fact that if the CDC was wrong then all bets about their
safely could have been off and the actual level of risk could have gone the
other way. They could have been in more, not less danger. But that
possibility never seemed to dawn on them, and their AIDS dissident movement in
all its forms seemed bent on making sure that it never did. They created a kind
of dissident groupthink that made them odd bedfellows with the mostly
heterosexual HIV establishment who also could absolutely not let themselves see
the connection between AIDS, chronic fatigue syndrome, HHV-6, and ultimately
the simmering autism disaster. (The fact that some "Duesbergians" themselves are rumored to have chronic fatigue syndrome is a kind of Big Bird of irony, but that is another story.)
Duesberg got a lot of things right and a
lot of things sort of right. He was right when he wrote that “Without going
back to check its underlying assumptions, the AIDS establishment will never
make sense of its mountain of data.” (IAV p.6) He didn’t quite get it
right when he concluded that “The single flaw that determined the destiny of
AIDS research since 1984 was the assumption that AIDS is infectious. After
taking this wrong turn scientists had to make bad assumptions upon which they
have built a huge artifice of mistaken ideas.” (IAV p.6) Duesberg very
simply failed to notice the fundamental wrong turn that was made before that
wrong turn. He never considered the possibility that if the nosological definition of AIDS
itself was wrong, and that the corrected definition just might support the
notion of an infectious epidemic and a virus-AIDS hypothesis, just not the
mistaken HIV one.
The great thing about Duesberg—for
students of what could be called called "homodemiology" or heterosexist epidemiology—is that
he criticized the logical absurdity of what I call GRID-think, (i.e.
heterosexist groupthink) which is in part the rather superstitious and bigoted
notion implicit in HIV epidemiology that viruses know intuitively who gays
are so they can choose to infect them and only them. Unfortunately, Duesberg
built his own quasi-GRID-think drug-and-lifestyle-paradigm on a similar
reality-challenged premise by saying that something non-infectious must explain
an epidemic confining itself mainly to a risk group. By pointing out the
logical absurdity of a virus limiting itself to one group of people, he opened
the way for a more radical critical political rethinking about what was going
on in the CDC’s epidemiology than he seemed prepared to do himself. He started
the job, but "homodemiological" and sociological analysis had to finish it.
Blaming lifestyle factors of gays was just another not-very-great correlation fingered
as causation, generating an alternative scapegoating epidemiology of blaming
the victims for what turned out to be the HHV-6 spectrum catastrophe.
Unfortunately, Duesberg exposed one wild goose chase and started another one
when he wrote, “The only solution is to rethink the basic assumption that AIDS
is infectious and is caused by HIV.” (IAV p.7) The only solution? Well,
not exactly.
Duesberg’s book will always be an
important source for anyone who wants to understand the evolution of the AIDS
mistake, even if Duesberg’s own theory turned out to be wrong. Most
importantly, Duesberg details just how abnormal and nearly psychotic the whole
scientific process of AIDS was and his work supports the argument that
something with a totalitarian je ne sais quoi was unfolding in the name of AIDS
science.
The very manner in which the HIV was
announced in 1984 as the probable cause of AIDS, according to Duesberg’s
account, was scientifically deviant: “This announcement was made prior to the
publication of any scientific evidence confirming the virus theory. With this
unprecedented maneuver, Gallo’s discovery bypassed review by the scientific
community. Science by press conference was substituted for the unconventional
process of scientific validation, which is based on publications in the
professional literature. The ‘AIDS virus’ became instant national dogma, and
the tremendous weight of federal resources were diverted into just one race—the
race to study the AIDS virus . . . . The only questions to be studied from 1984
on were how HIV causes AIDS and what could be done about it.” (IAV p.8)
At that point in time, Duesberg noted that
“serious doubts are now surfacing about HIV, the so-called AIDS virus . . . . The
consensus on the virus hypothesis of AIDS is falling apart, as its opponents
grow in number.” (IAV p.8) At that moment Duesberg still seemed
optimistic, as AIDS seemed to be taking place in the good faith universe of
normal science which was open to change and paradigm shift. Unfortunately,
because he was blind to the heterosexist sociological issues underpinning AIDS,
he was incapable of perceiving the unmovable backstage anti-gay epidemiological
values that were controlling the public health agenda and infecting the
science. He couldn’t see that it wasn’t just a matter of the practitioners of
this deviant science were digging in professionally; the whole "homodemiological"
culture was dug in, which was far more formidable than anything Duesberg could
have imagined. The political consensus about the etiological nature of “AIDS”
was not a just stone in the road of scientific process. Peter Duesberg had
found his way into normal science’s opposite world of abnormal and totalitarian "scientific" shenanigans.
As a paradigm that was supposed to capture
people’s imagination and cause a major shift or Thomas Kuhn type of conversion—or visual
gestalt-shift—from one consensus to another, Duesberg’s paradigm was nearly
dead on arrival. If he had simply taken his stand as a Nobel-worthy dean of retrovirology
and just left the cause of AIDS up in the air and concentrated on demolishing
the HIV hypothesis once and for all, the HHV-6 catastrophe and the Holocaust II
might have been stopped in their tracks.
Duesberg charged that the CDC’s paradigm
was “ineffective” and that “public fear was being exploited.” (IAV p. 9)
From his perspective, the public was being told the problem was bigger than it
actually was. True, public fear was being shamelessly exploited, but not in
the way Duesberg and his ardent followers thought. By framing the epidemic in an anti-gay manner,
public fear of gays, society’s sexual outsiders, was being manipulated
to hide the painful truth about the public’s risk of developing a complex form
of immunodeficiency or dysfunction. The public was being provided with what
Daniel Goleman called “a vital lie.” A terrified public, to the great detriment
of its future health was getting the reassuring heterosexist pseudo-facts about
“AIDS” it wanted to hear with the gay community losing its epidemiological
human rights in the process. And again, ironically, Duesberg and the
Duesbergians had their own set of heterosexist concoctions that were even
more reassuring to the heterosexual general population. And wrong. Both the
CDC paradigm and the cockamamie Duesberg paradigm misled a clueless and anxious public.
Duesberg’s shock at the nature of what was
going on is exactly why a formal theory of abnormal, totalitarian science is required to
comprehend and illuminate the AIDS era, just as the concept of totalitarianism
was required to understand the Hitler and Stalin eras. Duesberg asks a big,
ugly, rhetorical question: “How could a whole new generation of more than a
hundred thousand AIDS experts, including medical doctors, virologists,
immunologists, cancer researchers, pharmacologists, and
epidemiologists—including more than half a dozen Nobel Laureates—be wrong? How
could a scientific world that so freely exchanged all information from every
corner of this planet have missed an alternative explanation for AIDS?” (IAV
p.9) Too bad he didn’t ask how the exact same crowd could not see the chronic
fatigue syndrome epidemic for what it was. Ditto for HHV-6 and its insidious
spectrum.
Again, Duesberg’s answer to his own
question was that AIDS had been misclassified as an infectious illness and his
theory rested on the notion that “the premature assumption of contagiousness
has many times in the past obstructed free investigation for the treatment and
prevention of a non-infectious disease—sometimes for years, at the cost of may
thousand of lives.” (IAV p.10) Duesberg was setting the terms of the
twenty-five year debate between the mainstream AIDS establishment and what
became popularly known as the AIDS dissidents, or the Duesbergians. This
unfortunate dichotomy set the course for the wrong kind of debate, a contest
between HIV and Duesberg’s non-infectious drug lifestyle hypothesis, leaving
out the possibility that there might be a dynamic infectious agent other
than HIV that did indeed fit the causation criteria of a redefined AIDS
epidemic. No space was left in the debate for something like a new
multisystemic virus such as HHV-6, which was capable of causing an epidemic of
a more broadly defined variable disease state. Dueberg asserted that HIV “could
be the most harmful of . . . fatal errors in the history of medicine if AIDS
proves to be not infectious. “ (IAV p.10) Of course, if AIDS was
mis-defined and a dynamic viral agent other than HIV was spreading silently
and exponentially while the false Duesbergian debate sucked up all of
intellectual and scientific oxygen in the debate on AIDS, the harm could have
been exponentially worse. And it was.
In order for abnormal, totalitarian science to hold sway
over a society for a long period of time, it must have ample cooperation from
both the scientific and media communities and the Duesberg story provides
evidence that such was the case in AIDS. To explain how the media was
continuously kept in its subservient place during the AIDS debacle, he quotes
reporter Elinor Burkett of The Miami Herald: “If you have an AIDS beat,
you’re a beat reporter, your job is every day to go out there, fill your
newspaper with what’s new about AIDS. You write a story that questions the
truth of the central AIDS hypothesis and what happened to me will happen to
you. Nobody’s going to talk to you. Now if nobody will talk to you, if nobody
at the CDC will ever return your phone call, you lose your competitive edge as
an AIDS reporter. So it always keeps you in the mainstream, because you need
those guys to be your buddies . . . .” (IAV p.388)
Duesberg insists that the very defensive
and insular AIDS scientific establishment was determined to “confine the debate
to scientific circles.” (IAV p.389) He quotes that rather shocking
threat from the de facto AIDS Czar, Anthony
Fauci, who said, “Journalists who make too many mistakes, or who are sloppy are
going to find that their access to scientists may diminish.”(IAV p.384)
In a totalitarian world of "homodemiology" and abnormal, totalitarin science the definition of
“sloppy” will be that which contradicts the powers that be. Question AIDS and
you will need to look for a new career. (Given the degree to which AIDS science
often looks like a big unmade bed, it’s amusing to hear Fauci say the word
“sloppy” with a straight face.)
Duesberg also quotes two of the powerful,
public-relations-savvy virologists who suggested another tactic for dealing
with Duesberg and the critics of the HIV establishment: “One approach would be
to refuse television confrontations with Duesberg, as Tony Fauci and one of us
managed to do at the opening of the VIIth International conference on AIDS in
Florence. One can’t spread misinformation without an audience.” (IAV
p.39) There’s nothing in Thomas Kuhn’s theories about the process of normal
science about deliberately denying one’s critics an audience, or denying the
public exposure to scientific second and third opinions. It was a new world.
One of the more outrageous moments in his
book occurs when Duesberg reports that “Based on an anonymous source, key
officials of the United States government specifically engineered a strategy
for suppressing the HIV debate in 1987 while Duesberg was still on leave at the
N.I.H. The operation began on April 28, less than a month after Duesberg’s
first paper on the HIV question appeared in Cancer Research, apparently
because several journalists and homosexual activists began raising questions.”
(IAV p.32) A memo about Duesberg’s critique of the HIV theory was sent
out from a staffer in the Office of the Secretary of Health and Human Services:
“This obviously has the potential to raise a lot of controversy (If this isn’t
the virus, how do we know the blood supply is safe? How do we know anything
about transmission? How could you all be so stupid, and why should we ever
believe you again?) And we need to be prepared to respond. I have already asked
N.I.H. public affairs to start digging into this.” (IAV p.390) This is
an extremely important memo from the point of view of future
what-did-they-know-and-when-did-they-know-it histories that try to fathom all
the government‘s motivations throughout this scientific and political disaster.
It shows how clearly at least one person in the government could see the
potential dire consequences for the government of being wrong about HIV.
Somebody knew exactly what was stake.
In his book, Duesberg gives a number of
examples of the media seeming to have been pressured by the HIV establishment not
to cover the story of the controversy. According to Duesberg, “The MacNeil
Lehrer News hour sent camera crews to do a major segment on the controversy.
But when the . . . broadcast date arrived, the feature had been pulled.
Apparently AIDS officials had heard of its imminent airing and had intercepted
it.” (IAV p.392) Television shows on Duesberg involving Good Morning
America on ABC, CNN, Italian television, and Larry King Live met with a similar
fate.
According to Duesberg’s book, he “appeared
on major national television only twice. The first time was on March 28, 1993
on the ABC magazine program Day One. Even in this case, according to the
producer, Fauci tried to get the show canceled days before broadcast.’ (IAV
p.393) When Duesberg was interviewed for Nightline, he ended up only
being given a small amount of air time and Fauci showed up and was given the
lion’s share of the show to make the HIV establishment’s case. And Duesberg
fared no better overseas. The British medical and public health establishment
greeted a pro-Duesberg program with “stern condemnations” and subsequently the
British press “turned around and began criticizing the program.” (IAV
p.323)
One of the most interesting moments of
censorship occurred at the highest level of government when “Jim Warner, a
Reagan White House advisor critical of AIDS alarmism, heard about Duesberg and
arranged a White House debate in January 1988.” (IAV p.394) Duesberg
writes, “This would have forced the HIV issue into the public spotlight, but it
was abruptly canceled days ahead of time, on orders from above.” (IAV
p.394)
Duesberg didn’t fare much better with the
print media. He notes that The New York Times had written about him
only three times in the first seven years of the controversy and all of it was
negative. The same kind of treatment was doled out by The Washington
Post and “the San Francisco Chronicle intended to cover the story,
until it encountered opposition from scientists in the local AIDS
establishment.” (IAV p.394 ) Even the countercultural or alternative
press could not be counted on to give the controversy balanced or
independent-minded coverage. Duesberg reports that “In 1989 Rolling Stone had
commissioned a freelance writer from New York to write a Duesberg article, but
then canceled it during the interview with Duesberg in his lab.” (IAV
p.395) Both Harper’s and Esquire killed articles that had been
commissioned on Duesberg during the same period. The media was essentially
acting as an enabler of the culture of abnormal, totalitarian science.
Even more evidence that AIDS was a
manifestation of abnormal, totalitarian science can be found in the way that Duesberg
experienced censorship and blacklisting from formerly adoring
scientific circles and experienced roadblocks to having his ideas and
criticisms presented in the professional scientific literature. Duesberg writes
that “Robert Gallo and some other scientists began refusing . . . to attend
scientific conferences if Duesberg would be allowed to make a presentation.” (IAV
p.396) During the same period Duesberg rarely was “invited to retrovirus
meetings and virtually never to AIDS conferences, despite seminal contributions
to the field, including the isolation of the retroviral genome, the first
analysis of the order of retroviral genes, and the discovery of the first
retroviral cancer gene.” (IAV p.396)
Dueberg reports that his scientific papers
on AIDS “would constantly run into obstacles at every turn, from hostile peer
reviews to reluctant editors.”(IAV p.393) The rules mysteriously changed
for “the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, where Academy
members such as Duesberg have an automatic right to publish papers without
standard peer review.” (IAV p.397) An editor rejected Duesberg’s unique
and provocative submission by bizarrely saying that it was not “original.” And,
supporting the case for AIDS research representing the arbitrary make-it-up-as-you-go-along nature of
abnormal, totalitarian science, a subsequent replacement editor decided tradition had to be
completely ignored for this special case and the Duesberg paper had to be
peer-reviewed because it was “controversial.” (IAV p.397) It took
several months of hostile reviewers negotiating with Duesberg before the paper
was finally published. According to Duesberg, “Robert Gallo was asked to write
a rebuttal, but never did.” (IAV p.357) The strategic
silent treatment is part of the arsenal of abnormal, totalitarian science.
The punishments for anyone standing up to
totalitarian, abnormal science can be severe. Duesberg reports that “the AIDS
establishment made its most effective counterattack by going after Duesberg’s
funding, the lifeblood of any scientist’s laboratory. After coming out against
the HIV theory, Duesberg was denied continuation of an "N.I.H. Outstanding Grant"
by a group of scientists which included two who were proponents of the HIV
paradigm and three scientists who never even reviewed the grant. When a review
committee considered Duesberg’s grant proposal a few months later, “they did .
. . complain about Duesberg’s questioning attitude as the major obstacle to
funding him and singled out AIDS.” (IAV p.402) Subsequently, “every one
of his seventeen peer-reviewed grant applications to other federal state or
private agencies—whether for AIDS research, on AZT and other drugs, or for
cancer research—has been turned down.” (IAV p.403) Thus did Duesberg
come face to face with one of the telltale signs of abnormal and totalitarian
science: blacklisting. The long arms of HIV/AIDS politics reached into his life
at his university where “Several fellow professors” maneuvered “against
Duesberg in various ways. His promotions in pay were “blocked” and he was
denied “coveted graduate lecture courses.” (IAV p.404)
One of the most dramatic and creepiest
abnormal science moments in the Duesberg saga occurred in 1994 when a
high-ranking geneticist from the N.I.H. flew to California to present Duesberg
with an unpublished paper titled “HIV Causes AIDS: Koch’s Postulates Fulfilled.”
Duesberg was asked to be a third author on a paper he hadn‘t even
collaborated on. The paper had been commissioned by Nature editor
and HIV theory proponent, John Maddox. Duesberg was warned by his high-ranking
visitor that by continuing his opposition to the HIV theory he “would even risk
his credentials for having discovered cancer genes.” (IAV p.406) (The
willingness to “disappear” the past is another one of the telltale signs of
totalitarianism.) The geneticist told Duesberg that if he agreed to be an
author on the paper it would “open the doors for Duesberg’s reentry into the
establishment.” (IAV p 406) Duesberg made his polite "no thank you" in the
form of an offer to write something for Nature that said the direct
opposite of what that proposed unsigned paper posited.
A very thoughtful and philosophical man in
many ways, Duesberg sought to understand the recalcitrant system that was
making it so difficult for his ideas to be heard and tested, let alone prevail.
He blamed it on “command science” which by his analysis, derived its power from
three sources in the medical establishment: “(1) enforced consensus through
peer review, (2) enforced consensus through commercialization and (3) the fear
of disease, particularly infectious disease.” (IAV p.452)
Because all serious medical scientists in
America need grants from the NIH to survive, they often need to conform to the
establishment viewpoint. While the “peer-review system” is supposed to be like
an independent jury system, in reality, according to Duesberg, “a truly
independent jury system would be fatal to the establishment.” (IAV
p.452) The result is “the peers serve the orthodoxy by serving their own vested
interests.” (IAV p.452) Duesberg warned that “as long as a scientist’s
work is reviewed only by competitors within his own field, peer review will
crush genuine science.” (IAV p.454)
Ominously for AIDS patients and the myriad
victims of the HHV-6 catastrophe, Duesberg concluded that “Through peer review
the federal government has attained a near-monopoly on science.” (IAV
p.454) Abnormal, totalitarian science loves the absolute power of
monopolies. HIV became hegemonic because “a handful of federal agencies,
primarily the NIH, dominate research policies and effectively dictate the official
dogma . . . . By declaring the virus the cause of AIDS at a press conference
sponsored by the Department of Health and Human Services, NIH researcher Robert
Gallo swung the entire medical establishment and even the rest of the world,
behind his hypothesis. Once such a definitive statement is made, the difficulty
of retracting it only increases with time.”(IAV p.454)
Duesberg criticized the huge conflict of
interest in science that is caused by its commercialization. He argued that the
FDA, by essentially banning competing therapies, often helps the pharmaceutical
industry develop monopolies. Profits from products approved by the FDA often
find their way back to scientists who sat in judgment on fellow scientists “in
the form of patent royalties, consultantships, paid board positions, and stock
ownership.” (IAV p.455) In addition, “in order for a research product to
find a market, the underlying hypothesis for the product must be accepted by a
majority of the practitioners in the field.” (IAV p.455) In the case of
AIDS “commercial success can be achieved only by consensus. For example, an
AIDS hypothesis would not be approved unless it miraculously cured AIDS
overnight.” (IAV p.455) Thus Gallo’s royalties from an HIV patent as
well as William Haseltine and Myron Essex’s financial interest in HIV tests
indicate that they may not be the most disinterested parties to make important
decisions about the direction of AIDS research. And yet they were among the
powerful inner circle of AIDS research. No wonder Duesberg often experienced
forms of petulance and hostility from such characters rather than open-minded
collegiality. In essence, by telling an inconvenient truth he was a threat to
their lifestyles.
The third arm of the “command science”
which Duesberg discusses goes in the opposite direction of of what was really happening in the HHV-6 catastrophe which Duesberg was tragically blind to. Duesberg writes, “Traditionally, the power of medical
science has been based on the fear of disease, particularly infectious disease.
The HIV-AIDS establishment has exploited this instrument of power to its
limit.” (IAV p.456) Once again, Duesberg assumes that an infectious epidemic has essentially been invented out
of whole cloth by incompetent epidemiology. His book would have been more
accurately titled “Inventing the AIDS Epidemic.” Duesberg accuses the CDC of
delusional epidemiology driven by opportunism and hysteria. The manipulated
paradigm of an infectious AIDS epidemic was used to create a “stampede,” to
create “irrational” fear in the public, to cynically manipulate, to mislead.
And most importantly, from the Duesberg perspective, to build a lucrative new
empire for the CDC.
The truth about HHV-6 pandemic turns the Duesbergian thesis on its head. Duesberg sees a devastating,
apocalyptic epidemic being cynically and opportunistically imagined, while in reality, it existed big time. Other than
HIV not being the cause of AIDS, the other major thing Duesberg
fundamentally got right is the undeniable fact that the AIDS establishment was not really doing
science as we expect it to be done. Duesberg might even agree with the premise
that the science of AIDS was abnormal, totalitarian and even psychotic.
There is one other thing that Duesberg got
very right that deserves special mention. Duesberg performed an heroic
whistle-blowing act during dark hours of the epidemic: his fearless adoption of
a principled stand against the administration of AZT to AIDS patients. In a
chapter of his book aptly titled, “With Therapies Like this, Who Needs
Disease?”, he discussed Azidothymidine, or AZT. About this very toxic drug that
was being given to AIDS patients, Duesberg writes, “AZT kills dividing cells
anywhere in the body—causing ulcerations and hemorrhaging; damage to hair
follicles and skin; killing mitochondria, the energy cells of the brain;
wasting away of muscles; and the destruction of the immune system and other
cells. . . . Amazingly, AZT was first approved for treatment of AIDS in 1987
and then for prevention of AIDS in 1990.” (IAV p.301) Duesberg didn’t
say it, but he didn’t have to. AZT was more of a cruel, sadistic, toxic
punishment than a medical treatment for AIDS patients.
AZT beautifully expressed the AIDS
zeitgeist. AZT was invented in 1964 to kill cancer tumors, but the drug also
effectively killed healthy growing tissues and was shelved without a patent
because it was too toxic. Twenty years later scientists reported that it was
capable of stopping HIV from replicating. Duesberg had serious doubts about
even the basic AIDS research that was done with AZT which suggested that it
could be given in small enough doses so that it would kill the virus without
also killing the t-cells and other cells in the body. Not surprisingly, given
the nature of AIDS science, the research that supported the safety of using AZT
could not be subsequently replicated and showed that “the same low
concentration [of AZT] that stops HIV also kills cells.” (IAV p.313)
Like much of the abnormal science of AIDS, if you looked diligently beneath one
fraud, you could find yet another.
The person most responsible for foisting
this quasi-genocidal toxic drug on AIDS patients was Sam Broder, the man who
was Gallo’s boss at the National Cancer Institute. He was the man responsible
for the original questionable research suggesting that AZT could be given in
doses that wouldn’t harm patients. AIDS patients would pay a horrifying price
for his scientific slovenliness. Duesberg notes, “Broder and his collaborators
have never corrected their original reports, nor have they explained the huge
discrepancies between their data and other reports.” (IAV p.313)
Duesberg’s critique of AZT gets even more
devastating when he points out that the virus is dormant and therefore the
virus “can only attack growing cells” and “like all other chemotherapeutic
drugs, is unable to distinguish an HIV-infected cell from one that is
uninfected. This has disastrous consequences on AZT-treated people; since only
1 in about 500 t-cells of HIV anti-body positive persons is ever infected, AZT
must kill 499 good t-cells to kill just one that is infected by the
hypothetical AIDS virus.” (IAV p.313) In a sardonic understatement,
Duesberg concluded “It is a tragedy for people who already suffer from a t-cell
deficiency.” (IAV p.314) Needless to say, as time passes, giving people
AZT sounds more and more unquestionably like a form of genocidal insanity. Pure
"homodemiology" in pill form. For a few who watched in horror as this transpired,
it did then, too. Duesberg wrote “A toxic chemotherapy was about to be unleashed
on AIDS victims, but no one had the time to think twice about its potential to
destroy the immune systems of people who might otherwise survive.” (IAV
p.314) AZT belonged more in a court room as Exhibit A of a crimes against
humanity trial than in the bodies of AIDS patients.
Unfortunately, given the all the surreal
terror and hysteria of the time and the prevalent abject mentality of the
patients, the gay community and its doctors wanted something—virtually
anything—that could (or seemed to) address the problem. But make no mistake
about it. There were also financial considerations that helped create the AZT
disaster. Burroughs Welcome, the company that owned the patent on the drug, was
eager to win approval for the treatment of AIDS by the FDA. Unfortunately for
the AIDS patients, Burroughs Welcome’s head researcher worked closely and
effectively with Sam Broder to get FDA approval.
The process of testing the effectiveness
of the drug was also highly questionable. The double blind, placebo controlled
studies of AZT on AIDS patients were not exactly double blind and placebo
controlled. They were as abnormal as just about everything else in the
Kafkaesque world of AIDS science. The list of things that went off the rails in
the study was long. The study was stopped prematurely because the positive
“results seemed stupendous.” (IAV p.316) But as scientists looked more
closely at the details of the study it turned out that the AZT trial was just
as unreliable as much of the basic laboratory science that had launched AZT in
the first place. More placebo patients had died than seemed reasonable. A close
look at the study revealed that many of the AZT users had suffered horrific
side effects which were downplayed even though they “more than abolished its
presumed benefit.” (IAV p.317)
When more information surfaced about the
AZT trial, it turned out that the controls for the study were a complete mess.
It was virtually impossible to conceal which patients were on AZT because in
patients on AZT the drug killed bone marrow cells so quickly, that patients
would come down with aplastic anemia, a not-hard-to-detect dreadful disease. According
to Duesberg, “the patients, needless to say, often found out what they were
taking” (IAV p.318) from clues like throwing up blood or changes in
their blood counts. That had a grimly ironic effect on the study because those
who discovered they were on the placebo, by comparing the tastes of their pills
with the pills of those who were actually taking AZT, wanted to take what
they had been told was the life saving AZT. It was a heartbreaking sign of
the desperation and helplessness of their situation. According to Duesberg,
“the patients had bought the early rumors of AZT’s incredible healing powers,
and they really did not want to take a placebo. Some of the placebo group
secretly did use AZT, explaining the presence of its toxic side effects among those
patients.” (IAV p.318)
Because doctors easily noticed in the
so-called “blinded” study that the AZT patients seemed to be doing better than
the non-AZT patients, the study was ended early. The study’s credibility was in
shambles when it turned out that some of the patients on AZT had to be taken
off of it because it was so toxic. According to Duesberg, “many of the patients
simply could not tolerate AZT, and the physicians had to do something to save
their lives.” (IAV p.319) And “15 percent of the AZT group disappeared,
possibly including patients with the most severe side effects.” (IAV
p.319) An inspection of documents pertaining to the study obtained under the
Freedom of Information Act revealed a wide array of abnormalities in the study
that suggested the study was one of the more notable frauds of the AIDS Era and
"Holocaust II."
While the initial results of the AZT study
indicated an improvement of t-cells, it turned out that a temporary increase of
t-cells did not really indicate that the patients were getting better. And
there might have been some improvement of the patients from a broad spectrum
antibiotic effect. The only problem was that the drug was also toxically
undermining the immune system. It was opposite world science at its best.
AZT was in essence becoming another cause of AIDS.
Tragically, even though the study was a
scientific train wreck, the FDA approved AZT. The FDA panel that approved AZT
included two paid consultants from Burroughs Wellcome. Duesberg notes “the FDA endorsement
could seem a cruel joke perpetrated by heartless AIDS scientists. Patients on
AZT receive little more than white capsules surrounded by a blue band. But ever
time lab researchers order another batch for experimentation they receive a
special label . . . A skull-and-crossbones symbol appears on background of
bright orange, signifying an unusual chemical hazard.” (IAV p.324)
Kary
Mullis
Kary Mullis is a biochemist who won the
1993 Nobel Prize for the Polymerase Chain Reaction. He, like Duesberg, was
eventually troubled by the lack of evidence that HIV is the cause of AIDS. In
the foreword he wrote for Duesberg’s Inventing the AIDS Virus, he
reported on the events that led to his criticism and ultimate confrontation
with the AIDS establishment. Mullis had been hired by a firm called Specialty
Labs to set up “analytic routines” for HIV. In the process of writing a report
on the progress of his project, he went in search of support for this statement
that was going to appear in the report: “HIV is the probable cause of AIDS.” (IAV
p.xi) He was puzzled that there was no paper containing definitive proof of the
statement and one that was “continually referenced in the scientific papers”
about the epidemic. (IAV p.xi) He was puzzled that such a large
enterprise involving so many scientists and growing numbers of sick and dying
people did not rest on a solid foundation of a published paper that established
with great certainty that HIV was the probable cause. A computer search came up
with nothing. He started asking for the definitive reference at scientific
meetings, but after attending ten or fifteen meetings over a period of a couple
of years he “was getting pretty upset when no one could cite the reference.” (IAV
p.xi)
Mullis, without realizing it, had stumbled
into the world of the abnormal, totalitarian science of AIDS. He wrote, “I
didn’t like the ugly conclusion that was forming in my mind. The entire
campaign against a disease increasingly regarded as a twentieth century Black
Plague was based on a hypothesis whose origins no one could recall. That defied
scientific and common sense.” (IAV p.xii) It did however, make the
opposite world kind of sense that is associated with abnormal science. Like the
protagonist in Kafka’s novel, Mullis had arrived at the Castle of HIV research.
Science, logic and common sense would be utterly beside the point. And pungent
"homodemiology" was in the air, but Mullis, famous for his flamboyant,
unapologetic heterosexuality, couldn’t smell it.
When Mullis approached one of the founding
fathers of the HIV/AIDS paradigm, the French discoverer of HIV himself, Luc
Montagnier, he got the pass-the-buck, run-and-hide treatment that characterized
the behavior of many of the top HIV authorities. When Mullis approached Montagnier
at a San Diego scientific conference with his question Montagnier said,
condescendingly, “Why don’t you quote the report from the Centers for Disease
Control?” (IAV p.xii) This from the future winner of a Nobel Prize for
the discovery of HIV and one of the two people most responsible for an empire
of HIV testing, stigmatization and toxic treatments that has entrapped millions
of trusting people in its draconian public health agenda. When Mullis pointed
out the weakness of the answer, that it didn’t address the question, Montagnier
suggested that Mullis look at the work on Simian Immunodeficiency Virus. Mullis
responded that the research on that virus didn’t remind him of AIDS at
all, and didn’t answer the more basic question about the whereabouts of “the
original paper where somebody showed that HIV caused AIDS.” (IAV p.
xiii) At that point, Montagnier just abruptly walked away from Mullis. One
could say that it was a typical interaction between the two different cultures
of normal and abnormal science.
Mullis finally got his answer to the
question when he happened to be listening to the radio in his car and heard an
interview with Peter Duesberg. Mullis writes that Duesberg “explained exactly
why I was having so much trouble finding the references that linked HIV to
AIDS. There weren’t any. No one had proved that HIV causes AIDS.” (IAV
p.xiii)
Interestingly, although Mullis is often
considered a “Duesbergian,” in the foreword to the Duesberg book, he writes, “I
like and respect Peter Duesberg. I don’t think he knows necessarily what causes
AIDS; we have disagreements about that. But we’re both certain about what doesn’t
cause AIDS.” (IAV p.xiii)
Mullis also acknowledged in the foreword
the outrageous iatrogenic tragedy that was occurring in the name of the HIV
theory: “We have also not been able to discover why doctors prescribe a toxic
drug called AZT (Zidovudine) to people who have no other complaint than the
presence of antibodies to HIV in their blood. In fact, we cannot understand why
humans would take that drug for any reason.’ (IAV p.xiv)
Without formally calling HIV science
anything like a totalitarian opposite world of abnormal science, he came very
close when he wrote, “We cannot understand how all this madness came about, and
having lived in Berkley, we’ve seen some strange things indeed. We know that to
err is human, but the HIV/AIDS hypothesis is one hell of a mistake.” (IAV
p.xiv) It’s fair to say that he seemed to sense that we were in a period of
scientific psychosis.
When reporter Celia Farber asked Mullis
about “the guardians of the HIV establishment, such as Gallo and [Anthony]
Fauci,” in an interview in Spin in July, 1994, Mullis said “I feel sorry
for ‘em” and “I want to have the story unveiled, but you know what? I’m just
not the kick-’em-in-the-balls kind of guy. I’m a moral person, but I’m not a
crusader. I think it’s a terrible tragedy that it’s happened. There are some
terrible motivations of humans involved in this, and Gallo and Fauci have got
to be some of the worst. . . . Personally I want to see those fuckers pay for
it a little bit. I want to see them lose their position. I want to see their
goddamn children have to go to junior college. I mean who do we care about? Do
we care about those people who are HIV-positive whose lives have been ruined?
Those are the people I’m the most concerned about. Every night I think about
this. I think, what is my interest in this? Why do I care? I don’t know anybody
dying of it. They’re right about that, well except one of my girlfriend’s
brothers died of it, and I think he died of AZT.”
In a chapter on AIDS in his own book, Dancing Naked in the Mindfield, Mullis angrily described the world of AIDS
research: “In 1634 Galileo was sentenced to house arrest for the last eight
years of his life for writing that the Earth is not the center of the universe
but rather moves around the sun. Because he insisted that scientific statements
should not be a matter of religious faith, he is accused of heresy. Years from
now, people looking back at us will find our acceptance of the HIV theory of
AIDS is largely not science at all. What people call science is probably very
similar to what was called science in 1634. Galileo was told to recant his
beliefs or be excommunicated. People who refuse to accept the commandments of
the AIDS establishment are basically told the same thing; if you don’t accept
what we say, you’re out.” (DNITMF)
Mullis got the same kind of hostile and
dismissive treatment from the scientific profession that Duesberg did: “The
responses I received from my colleagues ranged from moderate acceptance to
outright venom. When I was invited to speak about P.C.R. at the European
Federation of Clinical Investigation in Toledo, Spain, I told them that I would
like to speak about HIV and AIDS instead. I don’t think they understood exactly
what they were getting into when they agreed. Halfway through my speech, the president
of the society cut me off. He suggested I answer some questions from the
audience.” (DNITMF) Playing the all too predictable emotional
blackmail card of AIDS orthodoxy, the president of the society then asked the
first question himself—whether Mullis was being irresponsible and possibly
causing people to not use condoms. The same game of AIDS emotional blackmail
was played by virtually every institution of public health and science for
three decades.
Unfortunately, in his book Mullis joined
in the same kind of speculative, homodemiological free-for-all that many of the
Duesbergians succumbed to, in which they concocted their own, usually
heterosexist-flavored paradigms. Mullis’s seat-of-the-pants paradigm was based
on “highly mobile, promiscuous men sharing bodily fluids and fast lifestyles
and drugs.” (DNITMF) Mullis accepted the basics of the CDC’s
deficient epidemiology without asking whether that too was more like the
science of 1634. His encounter with abnormal, totalitarian science never got him close to
lifting the veil on Holocaust II and the HHV-6 spectrum catastrophe and the
viral and epidemiological passageways between AIDS, CFS, autism etc. But his
challenge to the orthodoxy was certainly better than nothing and his notoriety
got his views broadcast widely. Even The New York Times was
forced to deal with Mullis, which they did in the characteristic arrogant and
dismissive way that they dealt with all important challenges to the HIV
hegemony. History will hopefully honor Mullis for using the leverage of his
Nobel Prize for a humanitarian purpose.
Without trying to be, Mullis was briefly
one of the more articulate voices of what could be called “the sorrow and the
pity of Holocaust II.” In his book, like Duesberg, he protested the use of AZT
on AIDS patients. Mullis wrote, “About half a million people went for it. No
one has been cured. Most of them are dead.” (DNITMF) And “I was
thinking that this technique of killing people with a drug that was going to
kill them in a way hardly distinguishable from the disease they were dying
from, just faster, was really out there on the edge of the frontier of
medicine. (DNITMF) It was also, unbeknownst to Mullis, on the
frontier of "homodemiological" and ultimately racist medicine.
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS about the International HHV-6 Protest and Teach-in at Harvard November 9-11, 2015
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Art, Cartoons, and Posters for the International HHV-6 Protest and Teach-in at Harvard (November 9-11, 2015)
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Bulletins from The Coordinating Committee of The International HHV-6 Protest and Teach-in At Harvard (November 9-11, 2015)
The Harvard Declaration of the HHV-6 Rights of Man
1. The right not to be lied to about the role of HHV-6 in AIDS.
2. The right not to be lied to about the role of HHV-6 in Chronic Fatigue Syndrome.
3. The right not to be lied to about the role of HHV-6 in Autism.
4.The right not to be lied to about the role of HHV-6 in Multiple Sclerosis.
5. The right not to be lied to about the role of HHV-6 in Brain Cancer.
6. The right not to be lied to about the role of HHV-6 in Heart Disease.
7. The right not to be lied to about the role of HHV-6 in Encephalitis.
8. The right not to be lied to about the role of HHV-6 in Cognitive Dysfunction.
9. The right not to be lied to about the role of HHV-6 in Drug Hypersensitivity Syndrome.
10. The right not to be lied to about the role of HHV-6 in Bone Marrow Suppression.
11. The right not to be lied to about the role of HHV-6 in Lymphadenopathy.
12. The right not to be lied to about the role of HHV-6 in Colitis.
13. The right not to be lied to about the role of HHV-6 in Endocrine Disorders.
14. The right not to be lied to about the role of HHV-6 in Liver Disease.
15. The right not to be lied to about the role of HHV-6 in Hodgkin's Lymphoma.
16. The right not to be lied to about the role of HHV-6 in Glioma.
17. The right not to be lied to about the role of HHV-6 in Cervical Cancer.
18. The right not to be lied to about the role of HHV-6 in Hypogammaglobulinemia.
19. The right not to be lied to about the role of HHV-6 in Optic Neuritis.
20. The right not to be lied to about the role of HHV-6 in Microangiopathy.
21. The right not to be lied to about the role of HHV-6 in Mononucleosis.
22. The right not to be lied to about the role of HHV-6 in Uveitis.
23. The right not to be lied to about the role of HHV-6 in Stevens-Johnson Syndrome.
24. The right not to be lied to about the role of HHV-6 in Rhomboencephalitis.
25. The right not to be lied to about the role of HHV-6 in Limbic Encephalitis.
26. The right not to be lied to about the role of HHV-6 in Encephalomyelitis
27. The right not to be lied to about the role of HHV-6 in Pneumonitis.
28. The right not to be lied to about the role of HHV-6 in GVHD.
29. The right not to be lied to about the role of HHV-6 in Ideopathic Pneumonia.
30. The right not to be lied to about the role of HHV-6 in Pediatric Adrenocortical Tumors
31. The right not to be lied to about the role of HHV-6 in the reactivation of endogenous retroviruses.
32. The right not to be lied to about the impact of HHV-6 on T-Cells.
33. The right not to be lied to about the impact of HHV-6 on B-Cells
34. The right not to be lied to about the impact of HHV-6 on Epithelial Cells.
35. The right not to be lied to about the the impact of HHV-6 on Natural Killer Cells.
36. The right not to be lied to about the the impact of HHV-6 on Dendritic Cells.
37. The right not to be lied to about the the impact of HHV-6 infection of the brain.
38. The right not to be lied to about the the impact of HHV-6 infection of the liver.
39. The right not to be lied to about the ability of HHV-6 to affect cytokine production.
40. The right not to be lied to about the ability of HHV-6 to affect Aortic and Heart Microvascular Endothelial cells.
41.
The right not to be lied to about the role of an HHV-6 cover-up in a
massive HIV Fraud Ponzi Scheme that in a number of ways resembles the
Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment and Nazi medicine.
